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PERSONALITIES,	POLICIES	AND	INTERNATIONAL	HISTORY:		
A	TRIBUTE	TO	DONALD	CAMERON	WATT	Joseph	A.	Maiolo		Abstract:	 This	 brief	 essay	 pays	 tribute	 to	 the	 contribution	 of	 Donald	 Cameron	 Watt	(1928-2014)	 to	 the	 historiography	 of	 twentieth-century	 international	 history	 and	 the	origins	of	the	Second	World	War	in	Europe.	It	sets	out	his	characteristic	approach	to	the	field,	especially	the	emphasis	he	placed	on	the	beliefs	and	perceptions	of	key	decision-makers	in	the	international	system	in	explaining	how	and	why	events	occurred	the	way	they	did.	This	essay	suggests	that	Donald	Watt’s	approach	to	international	history	was	shaped	by	the	connection	he	felt	with	the	post-1919	founders	of	the	field	and	by	his	own	experiences	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	Second	World	War.		Donald	Cameron	Watt,	who	died	on	30	October	2014,	occupies	a	central	place	in	the	historiography	of	twentieth-century	international	politics	and	the	origins	of	the	Second	World	War.	Born	on	17	May	1928,	he	was	educated	at	Rugby	School,	where	his	father	was	a	housemaster.	Later	he	won	a	scholarship	to	Oriel	College	Oxford	to	read	Philosophy,	Politics	and	Economics.	In	1954,	Donald	Watt	joined	the	Department	of	International	History	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	where	for	over	forty	years	he	inspired	students	with	his	charm,	whit	and	exhaustive	knowledge	of	international	history.	The	LSE	promoted	him	to	Professor	in	1971,	and	ten	years	 later	he	was	appointed	to	the	UK’s	premier	academic	post	in	the	field	in	international	history,	the	Stevenson	Chair.1		 Perhaps	 the	most	 important	 formative	 experience	 of	 his	 intellectual	 life	was	the	Second	World	War,	especially	its	immediate	aftermath.	Eleven-years	old	when	 the	war	broke	out	 in	1939,	Donald	Watt’s	 school	years	were	punctuated	with	filling	sand	bags,	learning	how	to	wear	a	respirator,	gazing	at	the	contrails	of	 bombers	 flying	 towards	 Europe	 and	 the	 breaking	 news	 from	 the	 front	 of	crushing	defeats	and,	eventually,	victories.	Too	young	for	military	service	during	the	war,	Donald	Watt	as	a	young	conscript	was	assigned	to	 the	British	army	of	occupation	 in	 Austria,	where	 he	witnessed	 the	 enormous	 human	 and	material	consequences	 of	 European	 civilisation’s	 capacity	 for	 self-destruction.	 As	 an		1 	‘Professor	 Donald	 Watt:	 Obituary’,	 The	 Daily	 Telegraph,	 14	 November	 2014	 at	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/11229261/Professsor-Donald-Cameron-Watt-obituary.html;	 Robert	 Boyce,	 ‘Professor	 Donald	 Cameron	 Watt	 (1928-	 2014)’,	 Department	 of	International	History:	News,	10	November	2014,	at		http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalHistory/news/DonaldCameronWatt.aspx			A	 list	 of	Donald	Cameron	Watt’s	publications	 can	be	 found	 in	Michael	Graham	Fry,	 ed.,	Power,	
Personalities	and	Policies:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Donald	Cameron	Watt	(London,	1992),	pp.	299-320.		
acting	sergeant	in	Field	Security	on	the	hunt	for	neo-Nazis	and	war	criminals,	he	was	introduced	to	the	bewildering	complexity	and	ethnic	hatreds	of	central	and	east-European	nationalist	politics.	These	experiences	fed	a	desire	to	understand	the	 war’s	 origins	 that	 took	 Watt	 in	 1951	 from	 Oxford	 to	 the	 team	 of	 young	scholars	 led	 by	 the	 eminent	 diplomatic	 historian	 Sir	 John	 Wheeler-Bennett	assigned	 to	 edit	 and	 publish	 the	 captured	 archive	 of	 the	 German	 Foreign	Ministry.2		 	In	 1954,	 Professor	W.	 Norton	Medlicott,	 then	 the	 second	 holder	 of	 the	Stevenson	Chair	in	International	History	(Sir	Charles	Webster	had	been	the	first),	recognised	 Watt’s	 talent	 for	 documenting	 and	 interpreting	 the	 intricacies	 of	foreign	policy	making	 in	 the	1930s	by	appointing	him	 to	 junior	 lecturer	 at	 the	London	 School	 of	 Economics	 and	 encouraged	 his	 interest	 in	 the	 origins	 of	 the	Second	 World	 War.	 Watt	 always	 spoke	 of	 Medlicott	 with	 fondness	 and	admiration.	 He	 admired	 the	way	 in	which	 he	 always	 tried	 to	 understand	 past	statesmen	in	their	own	historical	context	and	the	way	in	which	he	refrained	from	the	sort	of	harsh	judgements	that	were	all	too	easy	to	make	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight.3	Watt	 also	 credited	Medlicott	 for	 championing	 the	 transformation	 in	Britain	of	diplomatic	history	into	what	we	now	call	international	history.4		That	transformation	and	Donald	Watt’s	important	part	in	it	 is	the	key	to	understanding	how	he	conceived	of	his	own	values	and	purpose	as	an	historian.	The	foundation	of	international	history	in	Britain	dates	from	the	end	of	the	First	World	War,	when	a	group	of	influential	 liberal	internationalist	intellectuals	and	philanthropists,	many	of	whom	had	been	active	 in	 the	movement	 to	 found	 the	League	of	Nations	to	prevent	future	wars,	set	out	to	found	a	new	‘scientific’	study	of	 international	 affairs	 based	 on	 the	 ‘objective’	 study	 of	 official	 records.5	They		2	On	 the	 role	 of	 the	 captured	documents	 in	 post-war	historiography,	 see	Astrid	M.	 Eckert,	The	
Struggle	for	the	Files:	The	Western	Allies	and	the	Return	of	German	Archives	after	the	Second	World	
War	 (Cambridge,	 2012);	 D.	 C.	 Watt,	 'British	 Historians,	 the	 War	 Guilt	 Issue,	 and	 Post-War	Germanophobia:	a	Documentary	Note',	The	Historical	Journal	36	(1993),	pp.	179-85.	3	D.	 Cameron	 Watt,	 ‘Medlicott,	 William	 Norton	 (1900–1987)’,	 Oxford	 Dictionary	 of	 National	Biography,	Oxford	University	Press,	2004	at	http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/66374		4	See	 W.N.	 Medlicott,	 ‘The	 Scope	 and	 Study	 of	 International	 History’,	 International	 Affairs	 31	(1955),	413-26;	on	the	origins	of	international	history,	see	Patrick	Finney,	‘Introduction:	What	is	International	 History?’	 in	 Patrick	 Finney,	 ed.,	 Palgrave	 Advances	 In	 International	 History	(Basingstoke,	2004),	pp.	1-35.	5 	David	 Stevenson,	 'Learning	 From	 The	 Past:	 the	 Relevance	 of	 International	 History',	
International	 Affairs	 90/1	 (2014),	 5–22;	 and	 more	 generally	 Casper	 Sylvest,	 British	 Liberal	
Internationalism,	1880-1930:	Making	Progress?	(Manchester,	2009),	pp.	148-225.	
believed	 that	 the	 triumphalist	 nationalism	 that	 had	 pervaded	 the	 teaching	 of	European	 history	 before	 1914	 had	 been	 a	 cause	 of	 the	 Great	War.	 If	 another	disaster	was	to	be	avoided,	then	the	way	in	which	history	was	taught	across	the	European	continent	had	to	change.	The	peoples	of	Europe	and	their	leaders	had	to	 learn	that	 the	policies	and	actions	of	 their	nations	could	only	be	understood	and	calculated	in	relation	to	those	of	other	nations	and	that	their	fate	for	good	or	ill	was	bound	together.	 In	other	words,	the	European	great	powers	existed	in	a	Hobbesian	 state	 of	 nature,	 but	 the	 condition	 of	 international	 anarchy	 did	 not	condemn	them	to	perpetual	war.	Among	the	initiatives	to	achieve	this	ambitious	goal	were	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 British	 (later	 Royal)	 Institute	 of	 International	Affairs	 (Chatham	House),	 and	 the	 endowment	 of	 professorships,	 including	 the	Woodrow	 Wilson	 Chair	 in	 international	 relations	 at	 the	 University	 College	 of	Aberystwyth	 in	1919	and	 the	Stevenson	Chair	 in	 international	history	 in	1925,	with	Chatham	House	as	its	first	home	until	it	moved	to	the	LSE	in	1932.6		 Donald	Watt	embraced	the	values	and	goals	of	the	post-1919	founders	of	international	history	as	his	own	and	saw	his	work	on	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	World	War	as	part	of	the	larger	project.	He	saw	international	history	as	a	form	of	‘disaster	 studies’,	 in	 other	words	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 coming	 of	 the	 two	world	wars	to	acquire	useful	knowledge	and	insights	that	might	help	to	prevent	a	third,	and	most	 certainly	 final,	 global	war	 owing	 to	 the	 advent	 of	 nuclear	weapons.7	Doctoral	students	who	took	part	in	his	methodology	seminars	in	the	early	1990s	will	 recall	 analysing	 the	 correspondence	 of	 Sir	 Daniel	 Stevenson,	 the	 liberal-minded	Scottish	philanthropist	who	funded	the	Stevenson	Chair,	to	discover	the	original	purpose	behind	the	foundation	of	international	history.	As	Watt	taught,	the	key	principle	that	Stevenson	articulated	was	that	the	history	of	international	politics	 had	 to	 be	 written	 from	 multiple	 national	 archives,	 both	 official	 and	private	 holdings,	 to	 obtain	 a	 balanced	 and	 systematic	 perspective	 on	 the	unfolding	 of	 international	 events	 and	 the	 decisions	 and	 actions	 of	 the	 key	statesmen	and	officials	involved.	As	Watt	put	it	in	his	1983	inaugural	lecture	for	the	Stevenson	Chair,	 ‘the	historian	of	 international	 relations,	particularly	when	concerned	 with	 the	 disaster	 studies	 aspects	 of	 the	 field,	 engages	 himself	 in		6	Stevenson,	'Learning	From	The	Past’,	8-10.		7	Donald	Cameron	Watt,	What	about	the	People?	Abstraction	and	Reality	in	History	and	the	Social	
Sciences		(London,	1983),	pp.	4-5.			
studying	 in	depth,	over	time	and	in	the	round,	the	character	and	mind	of	those	certain	personalities	who	have	been	identified	as	playing	key	parts	in	the	chain	of	events	and	circumstances	leading	up	to	the	moment	of	disaster.’8		 The	 emphasis	 in	 this	 quote	 on	 key	 personalities	 was	 characteristic	 of	Watt’s	approach	to	international	history	and	his	methodological	contribution	to	the	field.	As	the	title	of	his	first	book,	Personalities	and	Policies,	succinctly	put	it,	Watt	argued	that	the	policies	of	states	and	the	course	of	their	interactions	could	not	 be	 abstracted	 from	 the	 flesh	 and	 blood	 people,	 the	 political,	 military	 and	economic	 elites,	 who	 formulated	 state	 policies	 and	 acted	 upon	 them.	 He	 was	critical	 of	 diplomatic	 historians	who	 unreflectively	 employed	 shorthand	 terms	such	 as	 ‘London’,	 ‘Berlin’	 or	 ‘Paris’,	 or	 ‘the	 Foreign	 Office’,	 ‘Auswartiges	 Amt’,	‘Quai	 d’Orsay’	 and	 so	 on,	 to	 stand	 in	 for	 the	 complex,	 fluctuating	 and	 varied	decision-making	processes	within	a	state	and	that	often	extended	beyond	those	groups	and	individuals	formally	charged	with	the	making	of	external	policy.9	To	understand	the	 foreign	policy	choices	of	states,	he	 insisted,	one	needed	to	 look	both	for	the	external	influences	and	constraints	that	limited	the	options	available	to	 decision-makers	 and	 for	 the	 internal	 factors	 particular	 to	 each	 set	 of	identifiable	policy	elites.	Donald	Watt	was	critical	of	 scholars	 (in	particular	 the	practitioners	 of	 the	 history	 of	 American	 foreign	 relations)	 who	 assumed	 that	international	relations	could	be	understood	 from	the	archives	of	any	one	state.	For	Watt,	the	writing	of	international	history	required	the	tracing	of	thought	and	action,	causes	and	effects,	across	national	boundaries	over	time,	with	identifiable	individuals	 and	 structured	 groups	 (such	 as	 foreign	 ministries,	 treasuries	 and	military	staffs)	as	the	key	players	in	a	complex	game	of	interaction.	Ultimately,	as	he	put	it,	his	approach	was	‘multi-biographical’	or	‘prosopographical’.10		 Watt’s	preoccupation	with	the	policy-making	and	decisions	of	identifiable	people,	the	way	in	which	they	exercised	power	within	a	national	political	system,		8	Watt,	What	about	the	People?,	5.	9	D.	 C.	 Watt,	 Personalities	 and	 Policies:	 Studies	 in	 the	 Formation	 of	 British	 Foreign	 Policy	 in	 the	
Twentieth	Century	 (London,	 1965);	 D.	 C.	 Watt,	 Succeeding	 John	Bull:	America	 in	Britain's	Place	
1900-1975	 (Cambridge,	 1984),	 pp.	 1-6.	Watt’s	 colleague	 and	 friend	 Zara	 Steiner	 also	 deserves	credit	 for	 drawing	 the	 attention	 of	 diplomatic	 historians	 to	 the	 role	 of	 officials	 and	 other	influences	on	 the	making	of	 foreign	policy:	 see	Zara	Steiner,	 ‘On	Writing	 International	History:	Chaps,	Maps	and	Much	More’,	 in	 International	Affairs	73/3	(1997),	pp.	531-46	and	her	ground	breaking	monograph	The	Foreign	Office	and	foreign	policy,	1898-1914	(Cambridge,	1969).		10	Watt,	Succeeding	John	Bull,	4-5.		
their	mindsets	and	milieu	naturally	 led	him	to	 focus	on	 the	role	of	perceptions.	No	contemporary	could	grasp	perfectly	how	the	whole	interplay	of	interactions	between	states	was	unfolding.	Misperceptions,	miscalculations,	misinformation,	mistiming	 and	 mistakes	 and	 the	 unintended	 consequences	 they	 generated	rendered	a	difficult	process	even	at	the	best	of	times	fiendishly	complicated	and	terrifyingly	dangerous	in	a	crisis.	‘Each	chain	of	perceptions	and	interactions	can	be	compared	with	the	balls	in	snooker	or	billiards,’	Watt	wrote,	‘but	there	are	at	the	same	time	as	many	different	games	superimposed	upon	each	other	as	there	are	 decision-making	 groups	 involved	 –	 plus	 one	 more,	 the	 real	 game,	 as	 it	 is	perceived	[with	the	benefit	of	hindsight]	by	the	historian’.11	And	while	there	was	a	real	game,	that	reality	was	not	fixed	in	the	way	it	operated.	As	he	described	it,	‘each	 player,	 or	 rather	 group	 of	 players,	 operates	within	 a	 series	 of	 rules	 and	conventions,	 some	 of	which	 are	 held	 in	 common	with	 the	 other	 players,	 some	imposed	 by	 their	 own	 past	 training	 and	 experience,	 some	 a	 part	 of	 their	relationship	with	 their	 own	particular	 audience	of	 sponsors	which	will	 be	 in	 a	perpetual	clamour	of	advice,	instruction	and	objurgation’.12	With	time,	the	rules	and	 conventions	 of	 the	 game	 changed,	 as	 did	 the	 players	 and	 their	 audiences,	though	with	greater	frequency.	According	to	Watt,	the	historian’s	working	model	(or	metaphor	 as	 he	 emphasised)	 of	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 international	 system	operated	could	therefore	be	elaborated	and	embroidered	by	the	hour.			 	The	prominence	that	Watt’s	conception	of	the	international	system	gives	to	the	rapid	interplay	of	decision	and	perceptions	within	and	between	states	led	him	to	prize	compelling	narratives	studded	with	rich	personality	portraits	as	the	most	 suitable	way	 to	write	 the	 history	 of	 international	 politics.	 He	 urged	 PhD	students	to	read	detective	stories	as	guides	to	good	writing	(the	political	thrillers	and	spy	novels	of	Eric	Ambler	were	a	particular	favourite	of	his).	He	compared	the	work	of	the	international	historian	to	that	of	the	detective.	Both	involved	the	careful	 reconstruction	of	 elaborate	 timetables	and	decision-making	 flow	charts	and	an	analysis	of	the	behaviour	of	people	under	stress.	In	piecing	together	the	course	 of	 events	 of	 a	 particular	 historical	 episode,	Watt	 cautioned	 against	 the	illusion	of	certainty	and	completeness.	 In	a	1977	essay	assessing	A.J.P.	Taylor’s		11	Watt,	What	about	the	People?,	16-17.	12	Ibid.		
work	as	a	diplomatic	historian,	Watt	dismissed	the	whole	notion	of	the	‘definitive	monograph’	 formed	 from	 a	 study	 of	all	 the	 evidence	 as	 ‘Germanic	 dogma’.	 No	scholar	is	free	from	biases	and	social	conditioning.	No	set	of	sources	is	complete.	The	mountains	 of	 files	 in	 twentieth-century	 government	 archives	 obscures	 the	yawning	gaps	in	the	record	as	well	as	the	importance	of	what	was	not	recorded	in	official	records	and,	indeed,	what	was	not	recorded	at	all.13		 In	 the	1980s,	most	 historians	 regarded	diplomatic/international	 history	as	 an	 intellectual	 backwater.	 Political	 scientists	 elaborating	 theories	 of	international	 relations,	 who	 might	 have	 been	 expected	 to	 attach	 some	importance	to	international	history	as	a	source	of	empirical	findings,	dismissed	the	 field	 as	 devoid	 of	 theoretical	 content	 and	 rigor.14	As	 Stevenson	 Professor,	Watt	led	the	defence	of	international	history	against	these	two	sets	of	criticisms.	Although	his	preoccupation	with	archives	and	personalities	sounded	very	much	like	a	defence	of	pure	empiricism,	 the	opposite	was	of	 course	 true.	His	history	was	 founded	 on	 deep	 reflections	 about	 the	 nature	 and	 origins	 of	 the	international	system,	the	nature	of	causation,	the	ethical	role	of	the	historian	and	the	 epistemological	 limits	 of	 historical	 research.	 He	 urged	 practitioners	 of	international	history	 to	borrow	 from	the	analytical	vocabulary	and	concepts	of	sociology,	 economics	 and	 above	 all	 international	 relations	 theory.	 However,	there	was	a	definable	limit	how	far	the	historian	could	and	should	draw	upon	the	social	sciences.	That	limit	was	the	point	at	which	the	real	flesh	and	blood	‘people’	of	the	past	became	mere	cardboard	characters	acting	in	compliance	with	grand	theoretical	constructs.	Although,	for	instance,	he	admired	the	skill	and	ambitions	of	French	practitioners	of	the	Annales	School	of	historians,	he	criticised	them	for	reducing	individual	lives	to	mere	data	points	in	recurrent	structures	or	universal	concepts.	He	was	 also	 critical	 of	Marxist	 historians	 such	 as	Timothy	W.	Mason	who	 portrayed	 Hitler’s	 decision	 to	 attack	 Poland	 in	 1939	 as	 a	 ‘function’	 of	 a	larger	 socio-economic	 regime	 in	 ‘crisis’	 rather	 than	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 an	
	13	D.	 C.	 Watt,	 'Some	 Aspects	 of	 A.	 J.	 P.	 Taylor's	 Work	 as	 Diplomatic	 Historian’,	 The	 Journal	of	
Modern	History	49/1	(1977),	pp.	19-33.		14	For	an	influential	and	pessimistic	assessment	of	the	state	of	the	field	at	the	time,	see	Charles	S.	Maier,	 ‘Marking	 Time:	 The	 Historiography	 of	 International’,	 in	Michael	 Kammen,	 ed.,	The	Past	
Before	Us:	Contemporary	Historical	Writing	in	the	United	States	(Ithaca,	NY,	1980),	pp.	355–87.	
ideologically	framed	intention.	Watt	saw	these	efforts	to	depersonalise	history	as	fulfilling	a	need	on	the	part	of	historians	to	achieve	pseudo-scientific	certainty.15	Watt’s	own	aversion	to	abstractions	and	historical	explanations	based	on	large,	impersonal	structures	and	forces	reflected	his	formative	experiences.	As	a	young	 conscript,	 he	witnessed	 the	 destruction	 caused	 by	 the	 Nazi	 and	 Fascist	revolutions.	His	 first	wife’s	 family	had	suffered	 from	the	evil	 that	was	 the	Nazi	‘Final	 Solution’.	The	advent	of	 the	Cold	War	was	 the	backdrop	 to	his	 time	as	 a	student	at	Oxford,	as	an	editor	of	captured	German	records	and	as	a	lecturer	at	the	LSE.	The	struggle	between	individual	liberty	and	the	collectivist	doctrines	of	the	 mid-twentieth	 century	 instilled	 in	 him	 distaste	 for	 the	 dehumanisation	inherent	in	statist	ideologies,	dogmatism	and	sectarianism.	That	distaste	left	him	suspicious	 of	 any	 historiographical	 trend	 that	 appeared	 to	 turn	 individual	humans	into	units.16	The	most	eloquent	and	powerful	statement	of	his	defence	of	the	 individual	 in	history	appears	 in	 the	preface	 to	his	magnum	opus,	How	War	
Came:	 The	 Immediate	 Origins	 of	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 1938-39.	 It	 is	 worth	quoting	 his	 words	 here	 in	 full:	 ‘This	 is	 not	 a	 story	 of	 men	 whose	 actions	 are	determined	 by	 large,	 impersonal	 forces.	 The	 forces	 are	 there,	 but	 the	 stuff	 of	history	 is	humanity.	 Impersonal	 forces	only	 figure	 in	 this	narrative	 in	so	 far	as	they	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 perceptions	 of	 the	 individual	 actors.	 History	 is	 lived	through	and,	for	the	fortunate,	survived	by	people.	Their	actions,	their	failures	to	act,	their	hesitations,	their	perceptions	and	mistakes	act	and	interact	upon	each	other	across	political,	social	and	culture	divisions’.17		 How	War	Came	 was	 Donald	Watt’s	masterpiece.	 In	 over	 seven	 hundred	pages	of	meticulously	researched	and	documented	pages,	the	book	covers	events	from	November	1938,	just	after	the	notorious	Munich	Conference,	to	the	start	of	the	 European	 war	 eleven	 months	 later.	 It	 exhibits	 all	 the	 qualities	 that	 Watt		15	Watt,	What	about	the	People?,	1-14.		16	There	is	no	comprehensive	study	of	how	the	Cold	War	shaped	methodological	disputes	among	British	 historians	 or	 in	 the	 humanities	 generally	 during	 the	 early	 Cold	War,	 but	 the	 relevant	chapters	 of	 Peter	 Novick’s	 That	 Noble	 Dream:	 The	 'Objectivity	 Question'	 and	 the	 American	
Historical	 Profession	 (Cambridge,	 1988)	 and	 recent	 studies	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 social	sciences	are	helpful	 indicators	of	how	the	battle	 lines	were	drawn:	see	 for	example	M.	Solovey	and	H.	 Cravens,	Cold	War	Social	Sciences:	Knowledge	Production,	Liberal	Democracy,	and	Human	
Science	 (Basingstoke,	 2012)	 and	 George	 Steinmetz,	 ed.,	 The	 Politics	 of	 Method	 in	 the	 Human	
Sciences:	Positivism	and	Its	Epistemological	Others	(Durham	NC,	2005).		17	D.	C.	Watt,	How	War	Came:	The	Immediate	Origins	of	the	Second	World	War,	1938-39	(London,	1989),	p.	xiii.	This	extract	from	the	book	was	read	at	Donald	Watt’s	memorial	service	at	St	Mary	le	Strand	Church	on	11	February	2015	by	his	grandson	Fergus	Cameron	Watt.	
prized	most	 in	 historical	writing:	 a	 careful	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 interaction	 of	perceptions	and	misperceptions	on	the	part	of	the	key	actors	to	the	drama,	and	a	remarkable	number	of	 insightful	and	often	humorous	pen	portraits	cataloguing	the	range	of	illusions,	delusions,	prejudices	and	conceits	entertained	by	Europe’s	statesmen	 and	 diplomats	 in	 the	 rush	 towards	 catastrophe.	Historiographically,	the	 book	 is	 the	 culmination	 of	 a	 lifetime	 of	 revisionist	 writing	 on	 the	 British	foreign	policy	of	 appeasement	 and	 the	making	of	German	 foreign	policy	under	the	Nazi	regime.18	Although	the	leaders	of	all	the	great	powers,	Stalin,	Daladier,	Roosevelt,	 Mussolini	 and	 their	 foreign	 ministers,	 diplomats	 and	 military	advisors,	 play	 their	 parts	 in	How	War	Came,	 the	 central	 actors	 are	 the	 British	Prime	Minister	Neville	Chamberlain	and	the	German	dictator	Adolf	Hitler.		Watt’s	 book	 was	 not	 a	 superficial	 account	 of	 a	 British	 prime	 minister	bullied	by	Nazi	threats.	It	is	instead	the	story	of	how	a	confident	and	self-assured	Chamberlain,	who	had	succeeded	in	deterring	Hitler	from	attacking	the	Czechs	in	September	1938,	attempted	to	contain	him	again	in	1939,	but	tragically	failed	to	do	so.	The	reasons	for	that	failure,	he	argued,	lie	less	in	the	personality	flaws	of	the	British	or	French	leaders	or	in	the	strength	of	their	armed	forces,	than	in	the	personality	and	miscalculations	of	Hitler.	Bitter	at	having	been	cheated	out	of	his	limited	 war	 in	 1938	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 Chamberlain’s	 diplomacy,	 the	 dire	warnings	of	his	military	advisors	and	a	lack	of	enthusiasm	for	war	on	the	part	of	ordinary	 Germans,	 the	 Führer	 simply	 refused	 to	 be	 deterred	 again.	 In	 the	summer	 of	 1939,	 he	 willed	 a	 war	 against	 Poland	 and	 through	 his	 own	miscalculations	 he	 triggered	 a	 general	 European	 war	 that	 his	 generals	 had	warned	 him	would	 end	 in	 Germany’s	 ruin.	Watt	 sums	 up	 his	 argument	 in	 the	final	paragraph	of	How	War	Came:	‘Neither	firmness	nor	appeasement,	the	piling	up	of	more	armaments	nor	the	demonstration	of	more	determination	would	stop	him	–	or,	 if	 it	did,	 it	stopped	him	only	from	7	p.m.	on	August	25	until	4	p.m.	on	August	31,	1939.’19		 	18	For	the	various	stages	of	his	thinking	about	British	foreign	policy	in	the	1930s,	see	D.	C.	Watt,	‘Appeasement:	The	Rise	of	a	Revisionist	School?’	Political	Quarterly	36	(1965),	pp.	191–213;	and	his	 ‘The	 Historiography	 of	 Appeasement,’	 in	 Alan	 Sked	 and	 Chris	 Cook,	 eds.,	 Crisis	 and	
Controversy:	 Essays	 in	Honour	 of	A.	 J.	 P.	 Taylor	 (London,	 1976),	 110–129.	 For	 a	 survey	 of	 the	historiography,	 see	 Sidney	 Aster,	 'Appeasement:	 Before	 and	 After	 Revisionism',	 Diplomacy	 &	
Statecraft	19,	3	(2008),	pp.	443-480.		19	Watt,	How	War	Came,	624.	
	 Sadly,	owing	to	 ill	health	and	fading	eyesight,	Watt	was	unable	to	follow	the	recent	transnational	and	global	turns	in	the	history	of	international	relations.	After	 he	 finished	 How	War	 Came,	 however,	 he	 spoke	 about	 returning	 to	 the	themes	he	first	explored	in	his	1975	book	Too	Serious	A	Business.	In	the	opening	chapter	of	that	book	entitled	‘The	Nature	of	the	European	Civil	War,	1919-1939’,	he	framed	the	interwar	years	as	a	transnational	‘civil	war’	between	the	forces	of	oligarchy,	 aristocracy	 and	 authoritarianism,	 Fascism	 and	 those	 of	 popular	democracy,	 socialism	 and	 revolution.	 By	 doing	 so,	 he	 anticipated	 the	 current	shift	in	the	historiography	from	the	activities	of	states	to	wider	concerns	such	as	ideas,	 culture,	 popular	movements	 and	 economics.20	What	 Donald	Watt	 would	have	 thought	about	 the	state	of	 international	politics	over	 the	 last	 five	years	 is	open	 to	 speculation.	 My	 own	 view	 is	 that	 some	 guidance	 can	 be	 found	 in	 his	introduction	 to	 the	 English	 translation	 of	 Hitler’s	Mein	Kampf,	 first	 penned	 in	1964	 and	 revised	 in	 1991,	 in	which	 he	warned	 readers	 not	 to	 surrender	 their	‘birthright	to	doubt,	to	hesitate,	to	be	undecided	and	uncertain,	in	brief	the	right	to	 be	 free,	 for	 the	 certainty	 provided	 by	 someone	 else’s	 faith,	 someone	 else’s	authority,	 someone	 else’s	 inner	 vision.’21	In	 this	 nationalistic,	 violent	 and	uncertain	time,	Donald	Watt,	a	deeply	humane	and	remarkable	scholar,	would	I	think	have	asked	 today’s	 statesmen	 the	question	 that	was	 the	 title	 to	his	1983	inaugural	 lecture	 and	 which	 echoes	 across	 the	 last	 century	 and	 into	 this	 as	 a	stinging	rebuke:	‘What	about	the	people?’		----	
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